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ERWIN P. WERNER, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALI· 
~"ci FORNIA ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS (a Corpora. 
_ tion), Respondent. 
[1] Libel-Damages-Statntol'J Limitation. - Civ. Code, § 48a, 
limiting recovery to special damages for libel in a newspaper 
. or slander by a radio broadcaster unless correction is demanded 
and refused, is not rendered invalid by Const., art. I, § 9, since 
the constitutional provision was intended, not to guaranty a 
remedy to those injured by the defamation, but only to make 
clear that the right of free speech does not guaranty im· 
.' t. munity from liability to those who abuse it. 
[!) Id.-Damages-Statuto17 Limitation.-Civ. Code, § 48a, is not 
· invalid under the due process clause of the United States 
· ,; Constitution. 
· [3] Id.-Damages-Statnto17 Limitatian.-At eommon law it was 
conclusively presumed that general damages resulted from the 
publication of a libel, and in enacting Civ. Code, § 48a, the 
Legislature could reasonably conclude that recovery of dam-
ages without proof of injury constitutes an evil. 
: [i] Legislature-Powers.-The Legislature may attack the evils of 
·;,i .••. unfounded litigation by abolishing causes of action altogether • 
. "(1] Libe1-Damages-Statuto17 Limitation.-In view of the con-
.'" fiicting rules of liability presented by the law of defamation 
J.: and the recognition in other situations that the Legislature 
,; may abolish causes of .ction to prevent unfounded litigation, 
.~;::. it cannot be said that the Legislature eould not reasonably 
.... 
conclude that the danger of excessive recoveries of general 
clamages in libel actions justi1l.ed limitation of recovery to 
special damages when a retraction has not been demanded 
and refused. 
~' !Sl Id.-Damages-Statutorr Limitation. - The Legislature may 
reasonably conclude that the public interest in the dissemina-
" tion of news outweighs the possible injury to a plaintiff from 
the pUblication of a libel, and may properly encourage and 
Ii' protect news dissemination by relieving newspapers and radio 
;'.: . .tations from all but special damages resulting from defama-
~, tWn, upon the publication of a retraction. 
.;;'[11 See 16 Cal.Jur. 128; 33 Am.Jur. 193. 
<:lIcK. Dig. References: [1-3,5, 6, 10,12] Libel, § 31; [4] Legis. 
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[7] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Scope of 
InquUy.-1t IS for the Legislllturtl to choose between conflict-
ing policies, and the Supreme COl1rt may not presume that 
in reaching a decision the Legisllltllre act.cd on impr?per 
motives. 
[8] Id.-Due Process of Law.-The Supreme Court. ~annot in-lOke i 
the due proeeS$ eJau!!e to invalidate a ItlglslatJve policy that 
it may deem unwise without exercising judicial censolship 
directed. not at tho constitutionality of legislation, but at its 
wisdom. 
[9] Id.-Class Legislauon.-A legislative classification is reason-
able only if thel'e Are differences between the classes and the 
differences are reasonahly related to the purposes of the 
statute. 
[lOa, lOb] Libel-' Damages-Statutol'J Limitation.-The classifica-
tion of newspapers and radio "tati(\ns apart frum others bears a 
reasonable relationship to the objectives the Legislature sought 
to achieve by enacting Civ. Code, § 48a, and such legislation 
does not violate the equal protection clause of the t'nited States 
Constitution and Cal. Const .• art. IV, § 25. 
[l1] Constitutional Law-Class Legislation.-The Legislature can 
make II elassiflcation for the purpose of applying a statute, 
not to the group classifled, but to everyone except that group. 
[121 Libel-Damages-Statutol'J Limitation.-In balancing the in-
terests of defamed plaintiffs against the interests of the publio 
in the tlillsemination of news alld the avoidance of the dangers 
of elcessive general damages, it cannot be said that the Legis-
lature rearhed an nnconstitntional eompromiBe iD enacting 
Civ. Code. § 48 •. · 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an ord(>r sustaining a demurrer to 
a complaint. Stanley N. Bal11(>s. Judge. Judgment affirmed. 
Action for damages for libel. Judgment of dismissal. 
afIlrmed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
William C. Ring as Amicus Curiae on bellalf of Appellant. 
O'Melveny & MyerS, Louis W. Myers, Sidney H. Wall· and 
Pierce Works for Respondent. 
Price. MacDonald 6: Knox, Harry L. Price, Calkins, Hall, 
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Cooper, George A. Helmer, John Hamlyn, Cosgrove, Clayton, 




Apr. 1950] WERNER v. SOUTHERN CAL. ETC. NEWSPAPERS 123 
(35 C.2d 121; 216 P.2d 8251 
ard Binford, Lawler, Felix & Hall, John Hall, Flint & Mac-
Kay, H. S. MacKay, Jr., Edward L. Compton, McEnerney & 
Jacobs, Garret McEnerney II and Stephen W. Downey, Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-PlaintifI appeals from a judgment of dis-
missal of his action for libel, entered upon his failure to 
amend his. complaint after a demurrer thereto had been sus-
tained. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant 
published in its newspapers false charges that he had been \' 
convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison therefor, that \ 
' the falsity of these charges was known or should have been 
; known to defendant, and that defendant published the charges 
:, with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame him. Defendant's 
r demurrer was sustained on the ground that plaintiff did not 
~, allege that he had complied with the provisions of Civil Code 
\~ section 48a- or that he suffered special damage as a result 
~,-------------------
" ·"1. In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a 
r newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover 
I' no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be 
r aot published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve 
upon the publish13r, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place 
of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be 
libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice and 
demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the publica-
tion or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous. 
;" "2. If a correction be demanded within said period and be not 
published or broadcast in substantially as conspicuous a manner in 
laid newspaper or on said broadcasting station as were the statements 
'elaimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or broadcast 
yithin three weeka after such service, plaintiff, if he pleads and proves 
peb notice, demand and failure to correct, and if his cause of action 
tie maintained. may recover general, special and exemplary damages; 
that no exemplary damages may be recovered unle81 the 
11IILlJllwr shall prove that defendant made the publication or broadcast 
actual malice and then only in the discretion of the court or jury. 
actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from the publica-
or broadcast. 
A. correction published or broadcast in IObatantially aa eon-
!f.I:piclD.otl8 a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting atatioD 
statements claimed in the complaint to be libelous, prior to 
of a demand therefor. shall be of the same force and effect aa 
lOch correction had been published or broadcast within three 
after a demand therefor. 
AI used herein, the termll 'general damagell,' 'llpecial damagell,' 
1~8%ef!111,1ar1 damages' and 'actual malice,' are defined as follows: 
damages' are damages for 1088 of reputation, shame, 
U~~,~tion and hurt feelings; 
damages' are all damages which plaintiff alleges and 
he has suffered in respect to his property, busin88l, trade, 
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of the publication. Plaintiff contends that section 48a is un· 
constitutional. 
[1] Article 1, section 9 of the California Constitution pro-
vides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish 
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge 
the liberty of speech or of the press .... " Plaintiff contends 
that under this section a person who defames another must 
be fully responsible for any damage caused thereby, and that 
the substitution of a retraction for all but special damages is 
an nncorutitutional attempt to relieve newspapers and radio 
stations from full responsibility for the abuse of the right of 
free speech. Defendant contends that the abuse clause of 
section 9 does not confer on a person defamed a right to the 
remedy of damages, but merely specifies that the constitutional 
right of free speech does not automatically carry with it 
freedom from responsibility for such abuses as were recognized 
by the common law or defined by the Legislature. We agree 
with defendant's contention. To hold otherwise would result 
in freezing the law of defamation as it was when the consti· 
tutional provision was originally adopted in 1849. 
The quoted provision is an almost exact duplicate of arti· 
cle VII, section 8 of the New York Constitution of 1821. Sub· 
stantially the same language is found in the constitutions of 
43 states. (Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, p. 5, 
n. 2.) The remaining states have a shorter guaranty similar 
to that in the United States Constitution, in which the 
"abuse" exception has been necessarily implied. (See Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470].) 
In none of these jurisdictions has the provision been construed 
as freezing the law of defamation as of the date of its adoption. 
Indeed, its primary purpose is to guarantee that freedom of 
speech shall not be restrained except to prevent abuse. 
Since 1872 the Legislature has consistently acted on the 
principle that it is free to change the law· of defamation. 
Many of the amendments have limited or abolished remedies 
theretofore available to persons defamed. Thus before 1945, 
the year of enactment of section 48a as presently worded, the 
Legislature had extended the absolute privilege with respect 
to statements in judicial, legislative, and other official pro-
eeedings, and the qualified privilege with respect to reports 
of such proceedings (Code Amendments 1873.1874, p. 184); 
it had extended the qualified privileges of section 47 of the 
Civil Code to fair and true reports of public meetings (Stats. 
t,: 
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[1895, p. 168); it had enacted the original version of section 
v,. 48a limiting the liability of newspapers, when the publication 
was made without malice through misinformation and mis-
take, and a retraction was demanded and published. (See 
San Francisco v. Industrial Ace. Com., 183 Cal. 273, 279 
[191 P. 26] .) As early as 1886 this court recognized the power 
. of the Legislature to extend absolute privileges and thus abol-
ish all remedies for defamation in certain situations. (Hollis 
v. Meuz, 69 Cal. 625, 629 [11 P. 248, 58 Am.Rep. 574].) 
Moreover, the courts have invoked the applicable code sections 
88 amended to determine the rights of the parties without in 
any way intimating that the Legislature was powerless to re-
. duce the remedies available at common law for defamation. 
(Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal 59,70 [28 P. 845] ; Ban v. Rawle" 
93 Cal. 222, 236 [28 P. 937, 27 Am.St.Rep. 174]; Gosewisck 
;r. Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 513-514 [119 P. 656, Ann.Cas. 1913D 
] ; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 799 
P.2d 713] ; Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 30 Cal.App. 
77, 88 [85 P.2d 949] ; Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 
,Cal.App.2d 340, 349, 353 [121 P.2d 761].) Given the view 
. that the Legislature has taken of its own powers with regard 
the law of defamation and the courts' acceptance of that 
it is clear that the abuse clause of the Constitution was 
E:lntlendled, not to guaranty a remedy to those injured, but only 
make clear that the right of free speech does not guaranty 
ijmmllLnit;y from liability to those who abuse it. (See County 
Lo, Angele, v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 392 
P.2d 773].) Accordingly, section 48a of the Civil Code 
rendered invalid by section 9 of article I of the Cali-
Constitution. 
It is also clear that section 48a is not invalid under 
process clause of the United States Constitution. 
1!",Ii~~JJ" as the Constitution otherwise provides, the Legisla-
complete power to determine the rights of individuals. 
1Jej~1/.4'U v. Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561, 568 [154 P.2d 674].) 
create new rights or provide that rights which have 
lNi;rinl1l111v existed shall no longer arise, and it has full power 
0\~egtlla1Ce and circumscribe the methods and means of e.ujoy-
rights, so long as there is no interference with con-
llitllLtiOnal guaranties." (Modern Barber Col. v. California 
Stab. Com., 31 Cal.2d 720, 726 [192 P.2d 916].) 
the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new 
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law, to attain a permissible legislative object." (Siltier v. 
Siltier, 280 U.S. 117, 122 [50 S.Ct. 57,74 L.Ed. 221}; Langdon 
.v. Sayre, 74 Cal.App.2d 41 [168 P.2d 57].) 
There are at least two bases on which the Legislature could 
reasonably conclude that the retraction provisions of section 
48a provide a reasonable substitute for general damages in 
actions for defamation against newspapers and radio stations, 
namely, the danger of excessive recoveries of general damages 
,in libel actions, and the public interest in the free dissemina-
tion of news. 
[8] General damages are allowed for "loss of reputation, 
shame, mortification and hurt feelings" (Civ. Code, §48a), 
but the extent of such injuries is difficult to determine. At 
common law it was conclusively presumed that general dam-
ages resulted from the publication of a libel. "The practical 
result is that the jury may award not only nominal damages, 
but substantial sums in compensation of the supposed harm to 
the plaintiff's reputation, without any proof that it has in fact 
occurred." (Prosser, Torts, § 92, p. 797.) The Legislature 
could reasonably conclude that recovery of damages without 
proof of injury constitutes an evil. 
[4] It is settled that the Legislature may attack the evils 
of unfounded litigation by abolishing causes of action al-
together. Thus statutes abolishing civil actions for alienation 
of a1fection, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of 
promise to marry have generally been !lpheld. (Langdon v. 
Sayre, 74 Cal.App.2d 41 [168 P.2d 57] ; see, anno. 158 A.L.R. 
617, and casescit~d.). ,The purpose of such legislation has 
been stated by the New ,York Legislature as follows: "The 
remedies heretofore provided by law for 'the enforcement of 
actions based upon [alleged] alienation of a1fections, erimi-
nal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, 
having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoy-
ance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to 
many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, 
who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such reme-
dies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their 
unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehi-
cles for the commission or attempted commission of crime 
and in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of 
frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the state 
that the best interests of the people of the state will be served ' 
by the abolition of such rf'medies." ( Civil Practice Act, 
§§ 61-& et seq.) Similarly it has been held that the dangers 
) 
r 
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~~.: of unfounded actions based on negligence justify legislative 
abolition of certain classes of such actions. •• We are not un-
aware of the increasing frequency of litigation in which pas-
sengers carried gratuitously in automobiles, often casual guests 
or licensees, have sought the recovery of large sums for injuries 
· alleged to have been due to negligent operation. . . . Whether 
· there has been a serious increase in the evils of vexatious liti-
gation in this class of eases, where the carriage is by auto-
'. mobile, is for legislative determination and, if found, may 
be the basis of legislative action further restricting the 
. Its wisdom is not the concern of courts." (Silver 
T. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122-123 [50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221] ; 
· also, anno., 111 A.L.R. 1011, and cases cited.) 
.These cases involved the danger of imposing liability when 
had been no wrong. The same principles are appli-
to the danger of imposing excessive liability when no 
damages have been proved. Moreover, in the common 
of slander, as distinct from libel, there is ample prece-
for denying any recovery unless special damages are 
"All other slanderous words, no matter how grossly 
fI::.I.wn.u.I.Jws or defamatory they may be, which cannot be fitted 
the arbitrary categories listed above [imputation of a 
r·.enl[)US crime or a loathsome disease or affecting plaintiff in 
business, trade, profession or office], are actionable only 
proof of 'special' damage-special in the sense that it 
be supported by specific proof, as distinct from the 
...,.IO.,£.ILJ.' damage I presumed to follow in the case of libel or the 
umC18 of slander already considered." (Prosser, Torts, § 92, 
) Although this distinction between libel and slander 
attacked as the irrational result of historical acci-
"one reason that the law has remained as it stands is 
is violent dispute as to the direction in which it 
move. Assuming that the distinction between libel 
slaIndE!r is a thing without reason and to be abandoned, 
four proposals have been made as to the basis on 
a'W'IIlcib., the two might be united [only the first two are quoted 
To require, in all cases, proof of actual damage as 
Iieelnti;al to the existence of a cause of action. This suggestion, 
[·C('J.1U'I!Ie. has been a popular one with publishers. It un-
would do away with the serious evil of the. abuse 
action of defamation as a weapon of extortion; but it 
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age is impossible in many-cases where, from the character 
of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publica-
tion, it is almost certain that it must have occurred." 
"2. To make all defamation, oral or written, actionable 
without proof of damage. This, in substance, is the present 
law of Louisiana, where it seems to be administered without 
nndue difficulty. Opposed to this is the obvious argunient 
that much defamatory language, particularly in the case 
of hasty spoken words, is trivial, harmless, and unworthy of 
redress; that the opportunities for extortion would be vastly 
increased; and that in the interest of freedom of speech some 
safety-Valve must be left open for the expression of unflatter-
ing views." (Prosser, Torts, § 92, pp. 808-809.) 
[6] In view of the conflicting rules of liability presented 
by the law of defamation itself and the recognition in other 
situations that the Legislature may abolish causes of action 
to prevent unfounded litigation, we cannot say that the 
Legislature could not reasonably conclude that the danger of' 
excessive recoveries of general damages in libel actions j usti-
fied limitation of recovery to special damages when a retrac-
tion has not been demanded and refused. 
[6] Nor can we take exception to the second basis upon 
which the Legislature could justify its limitation of recovery 
to special damages, namely, the public interest in the free 
dissemination of news. In view of the complex and far-flung 
activities of the news services upon which newspapers and 
radio stations must largely rely and the necessity of publish-
ing news while it is new, newspapers and radio stations may 
in good faith publicize items that are untrue but whose falsity 
they have neither the time nor the opportunity to ascertain. 
The Legislature may reasonably conclude that the publie 
interest in the dissemination of news outweighs the possfble 
injury to a plaintiff from the publication of.a libel, and may 
properly encourage and protect news dissemination by reliev-
ing newspapers and radlo stations from all but special damages 
resulting from defamation, upon the publication of a retrac-
tion. (See AUm v. Pioneer Press Co./ 4O Minn. 117, 120 [41 
N.W. 936, 12 Am.St.Rep. 707, 3 L.R.A. 532] ; Hall, Preserving 
Liberlfl of Ihe Press by the Defense of Privilege in Moe' 
AcWms, 26 Cal.L.Rev. 226.) Plaintiff contends, however, that 
no public interest is served by the publication of false nem 
and that it is desirable to enforce full responsibility as a deter-
rent to careless or malicious publication. He contends that 
the statute was enacted, not to eneourage dissemination of 
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news or to lessen the evils of excessive recoveries. but to grant 
newspapers and radio stations special privileges. 
Certainly there are forceful arguments in favor of the 
policy plaintiff advocates. (See Morris, Inadvertent News-
'paperlAoel and RetractiO'n, 32 Ill.L.Rev. 36, 45 j Paton, Reform 
and the English Law of Defamation, 33 Ill.L.Rev. 669.) 
'[7] It is for the Legislature, however, to choose between 
l.eon:!1ictllllg policies, and this court may not presume lliat in 
J;J:eac:nlIlg its decision it acted upon improper motives. Ie. • • a 
must judge by results, not by the varied factors 
have determined legislators' votes. We cannot 
a search for motive in testing constitutionality." 
'_'W"~V. v. Family Secur. L. Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220. 224 r69 
550. 93 L.Ed. 632, 10 A.L.R.2d 945J j Goesaert v. Oleary, 
U.S. 464. 466-467 r69 S.Ct. 198. 93 L.Ed. 163].) 
[8] This court cannot invoke the due process clause to 
Y<iUJ'U""" a legislative policy that it may deem unwise without 
I'tM[er,eisilnll judicial censorship directed uot at the constittltion~ 
of legislation but at its wisdom, a censorship whose dan-
Mr. Justice Holmes clearly envisaged: "I have not yet 
E'A'''"",na1'",lv expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the 
increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment 
eutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights 
" States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any 
but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they 
to strike a majority of this Court as, for any reason 
ildfmrabl,e. I cannot believe that the Amendment was in-
to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or 
beliefs in its prohibitions." (Baldwin v. Missoun, 281 
586, 595 [50 S.C~. 436, 74 L.Ed. 1056], dissent.) This 
has found increasing acceptance by the United States 
, Court." This Court beginning at least as early as 
when the N ebbia case was decided, has steadily rejected 
, process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage 
~,cases. In doing so it has consciously returned closer 
elOSer to the earlier constitutional principle that states 
'power to legislate agai;nst what are found to be injurious 
in their internal commercial and business afi'airs, 
88 their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal 
prohibition, or of some valid federal law. [Cita-
Under this constitutional doctrine the due process 
'no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress 
legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they 
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attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which 
they agreed as offensive to the public welfare." (Lincoln Ped. 
L. Union v. Northwestern 1. & M. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-537 
[69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473].) 
"Despite evidence to the contrary, respondents see no evil 
to be corrected by this legislation. We are asked to agree 
with respondents and call the statute arbitrary and unreason-
able. 
"Looking through the form. of this plea to its essential 
basis, we cannot fail to recognize it as an argument for in-
validity because this Court disagrees with the desirability of 
the legislation. We rehearse the obvious when we say that 
our function is thus misconceived. We are not equipped to 
decide desirability; and a court cannot eliminate measures 
which do not happen to suit its tastes if it seeks to maintain a 
democratic system. The forum for the correction of ill-con-
sidered legislation is a responsive legislature." (Daniel v. 
Pamily Secur. L. Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 [69 S.Ct. 550, 93 
L.Ed. 632, 10 A.L.R.2d 945].) 
The responsiveness of a legislature reHects the alertness 
of the electorate, and legislation ill-considered in a climate of 
indifference may continue to Hourish in such a climate to the 
dismay of interested citizens whose numbers may be small. 
If these few then turn impatiently to the courts, however, 
abandoning the hard task of dispelling the general lethargy, 
they accomplish nothing to improve legislation, for if courts 
are called upon to set their judgment as to what is wise against 
the popular judgment they may summarily put an end to 
certain laws that may be foolish but also to certain laws that 
may be wise, and particularly to laws that may be wise in 
the long run although they_appear foolish at the moment. 
"Most laws dealing with economic and social problems are 
matters of trial and error. That which before trial appears 
to be demonstrably bad may belie prophesy in actual opera-
tion. It may not prove good, but it may prove innocuous. 
But even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that 
its defects should be demonstrated and removed than that the 
law should be aborted by judicial fiat. Such an assertion of 
judicial power deHects responsibility from those on whom 
in a democratic society it ultimately rests-the people." (Mr. 
Jnstice Frankfurter concurring in A.1!.L. v. American Sash 
& D. Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553 [69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6 
A.L.R.2d 481].) 
Plainti1f then contends that section 48& violates the equal 
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protection clause of the United States Constitution and sec-
tion 25 of article IV of the California Constitution in granting 
to newspapers and radio stations privileges denied to others, 
thus depriving plaintiffs defamed by newspapers or radio 
stations of rights enjoyed by plaintiffs defamed by others. 
These provisions were recently reconsidered in COllnty of 
Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Ca1.2d 3i~ r 196 
P.2d 773], where the court said in quoting from People v. 
Western Fru1't Growers, 22 Cal.2d 494 [140 P.2d 13], " 'Proh-
. (Iems of classification under the California Constitution are 
thus similar to those presented by the federal equal protection 
of the laws clause of the 14th Amendment. Under either 
provision, the mere production of inequality which necessarily 
to some degree in every selection of persons for regu-
1t'lIltl(Jm does not place the classification within the constitutional 
The discrimination or inequality produced, in 
to conflict with the constitutional provisions, must be 
11:7 aCLU~L11'y and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary," or the 
' __ "_1.,"'.'- determination as to what is a sufficient distinction 
warrant the classification will not be overthrown. [Cita-
When a legislative classification is questioned, if any 
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain 
there is a presumption of existence of that state of facts, 
the burden of showing arbitrary action rests upon the 
who assails the classification.' (22 Cal.2d 494, 506.)" 
CaUd 378, 390.) I 
A classification is reasonable, however, only if there 
difrer'enl~es between the classes and the differences are 
related to the purposes of the statute. (Account-
Corp. v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 34 Ca1.2d 186, 190 
P.2d 984], and cases cited; see Tussman and ten Broek, 
Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 341, 346.) 
of principle and in view of my attitude toward 
protection clause, I do not think differences of treat-
law should be approved on classification because 
cd.i:l'I'eJ'eneeR unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal 
ii'\fAMir'Tl clause ceases to assure either equality or protection 
is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be 
out between those bound and those left free. This 
has often announced the principle that the differentia-
have an appropriate relation to the object of the 
or ordinance. See, for example, Mayflower Farms 
E,!!ck, 297 U.S. 266 [56 S.Ct. 457, 80 L.Ed. 675]; 
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Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 [51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264). 
In the latter case a motor vehicle regulation was struck down 
upon citation of Illany authorities because 'such a clas:,;ifirEltion 
is not based on anything having relation to thE' purposf' for 
which it is made;' 282 U.S. 553. 567. If that were the situ-
ation here. I should think we should reach a similar eonclu-
sion.·' (Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express 
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 115 [69 S.Ct. 463.93 L.Ed. 
5331.) It is therefore necessary to determine whether the 
classification of newspapers and radio stations apart from 
others bears a reasonable relationship to the objectives the 
Legislature sought to achieve by enacting section 48a. 
It is contended that if the statute is designed to eliminate 
the danger of recoveries of excessive geLeral damages, it is 
too narrow in that it does not attack the danger generally 
but only in litigation against newspapers and radio stations. 
Conversely, it is contended that if it is designed to encourage 
the free dissemination of news, it is too broad in that its pro-
tection is extended not only to thosE' who may in good faith 
disseminate defamatory material but also to those who dis· 
seminate deliberate and malicious falsehoods. There are per· 
suasive analogies, however; that support the validity of the 
classification in either case. 
[lOa] Certainly a statute cannot be limited to a specific 
class without reason. (Missouri, Kansas &- Texas Ry. Co. v. 
May, 194 U.S. 267. 269 [24 S.Ct. 638. 48 L.Ed. 971); ct., 
Del Mar Cann~ng Co. v. Payne, 29 Ca1.2d 380 [175 P.2d 231], 
with Ferrante v. Fish &- Oame Commission. 29 Cal.2d 365 
[175 P.2d 222).) The Legislature could reasonably conclude 
that defamation suits against newspapers and radio stations 
constituted the most conspicuous example of the danger it 
sought to preclude. It is not prohibited by the equal protec-
tion clause from striking the evil where it is felt ·most. (Ooe-
saert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 [69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 
163) ; Railway Ex'press Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 
[69 8. Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533).) In considering an analogous 
situation involving legislation limiting the right to recover 
damages for negligence the United States Supreme Court 
said, ". . . there is no constitutional requirement that a regu-
lation, in other respects permissible, must reach every class 
to which it might be applied-that the legislature must be held 
rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. [Citations.) 
In this day of almost universal highway transportation by 
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plicity of suits growing out of the gratuitous carriage of 'pas-
sengers in automobiles do not present so conspicuous an ex-
ample of what the legislature may regard as an evil, as to 
justify legislation aimed at it, even though some abuses 1D&7 
Dot be hit. [Citations.) It is enough that the present statute 
· strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases 
where it most frequently occurs." (8iWer v. 8iltJer, 280 
U.S. 117, 123-124 [50 S.Ct; 57, 74 L.Ed. 221].) Similarly 
· ~ this case, we cannot say that the Legislature could not 
· reasonably conclude that because "f the business they are 
enf!ragl,(1 in, newspapers and radio stations are the most fre-
objects of defamation actions and that the danger of 
'ex(!ess:ive damages in actions against them is greatest because 
their reputed ability to pay; See, Morris, IWtJ6f'ten' 
NellOslllap~w LAoel and Retraction, 32 ID.L.Rev. 36, 43; cf., 
_·J~III'.I'n.d v. Moore, 9 Cal.2d 571, 578-580 [71 P.2d 922]. dis-
.cuing rule of inadmissibility of evidence that defendant is 
.'in .. " .... tt in personal injury actions.) 
. Moreover, in balancing the danger of recoveries of ex-
general damages against leaving plaintiffs with no 
E'lI\lfe,~ti'Te remedy for injury to their reputations, the Legis-
.1tatllre could properly take into consideration the fact that· a 
lIJJ~etracti.on widely circulated by a newspaper or radio station 
have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an indi-
and could thus class newspapers and radio stations 
"Now, as far as vindication of character or reputation 
it stan4s to reason that a full and frank re-
o! the false charge, especially if published as widely 
'. substantially to the same readers as was the libel,is UBU-
.. ' in fact a more complete redress than a judgment for 
_Illig •• " (Allen v. Pioneer Press 00., 40 MinD. 117, 124 
. 936, 12 Am.St.Rep. 707, 3 L.RA. 532].) "... ex-
ilpa1tion in the eyes of the world is not accomplished by 
of a judgment on the musty rolls of a court. 
jUligIneJlt must be publicized, if those who have read the 
to know of its adjudged falsity. Unless the com-
is both small and interested, 80 that news of the 
dglDeIlt is spread throughout it verbally, the plaintiff'. 
!bUe&tton depends upon the mercy of the press. The van-
. defendant may not mention the judgment. Even his 
lIjpeti1tol'll-if he has any-may keep silent, out of fear of 
M1'It'itri,.,.,. a weapon which may be used against them when 
boggle." (Morris, Inadverten' Newspaper lAo" 
''''WGl,Uon. 32 ID.L.Rev. 36, 38.) 
) 
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[11] The Legislature can ml'.ke a classification for the pur-
pose of applying a statute, not to the group classified, but to 
everyone except that group. Thus a Michigan statute pro-
hibits females from acting as bartenders unless they are 
the wives or daughters of male owners of bars. In upholding 
this statute the Sup~eme Court said, ,. Since bartending by 
women may. in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise 
to moral and social problems against which it may devise 
preventive measures, the legislature need not go the full length 
of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of 
females other factors are operating which either eliminate or 
reduce the moral and social problems otherwisp ('alling for 
prohibition~ Michigan evidently believes that the oversight 
assured through oWliership of a bar by a barmaid's husband 
or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid 
without such protecting oversight. This court is certainly 
not in a position to gainsay such belief by the Michigan legis-
lature. If it is entertainable, as we think it is, Michigan has 
not· violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws. 
We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively 
the mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives. 
Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in rea-
son, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse 
behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male 
bartenders to try to monopolize the calling,'" (Goesae"t v. 
Cka"y, 335 U.S. 464, 466-467 [69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 
163].) Thus the equal protection clause did not require 
Michigan to exclude all women or none from bartending, for 
the reasons for exclu~ion were not so compelling for one group 
as for the others. SimilaTly. in this case, the Legislature could 
stop short of substituting a retraction for general damages in 
all cases, because it could reasonably conclude that in those 
cases where it did so provide a retraction would be a more 
effective substitute than in those cases the statute does not 
reach. 
[lOb] Section 48a may also be sustained under the equal 
protection clause on the theory that its purpose is to encourage 
the dissemination of news. Although it extends its protection 
to' those who may deliberately and maliciously disseminate 
libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that it was 
necessary to go so far effectively to· protect those who in good 
faith and without malice inadvertently publish defamatory 
statements. The argument that the statute denies equal pro-
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akin to the argument that it violates the due process clause 
and is equally specious. The legislation abolishing heart-
balm suits, for example, was designed, not to protect those who 
deliberately or maliciously alienated the affection of one spouse 
I. for another, but to insure that innocent defendants will not be 
; sued. Again, guest statutes were designed not to protect 
, negligent drivers but to insure that innocent drivers will 
not be subjected to the hazards of a trial with the possibility 
of an erroneous conclusion on the facts. There are many 
examples in the law of defamation in which the defendant'l 
ltate of mind, his intent, or his negligence is immaterial to 
the question of liability. Thus, absolute privilege exempli. 
·l1es the belief that in some case the public interest in freedom 
of expression outweighs the harm that may be done to the 
persons defamed.. (See, Prosser, Torts, § 94, p. 823; Civ. 
Code, §47(1), (2), (4), (5).) "The rule exists, not because 
malicious conduct of such persons ought not to be action-
but because, if their conduct were actionable, actions 
be brought against them in cases in which they had 
spoken falsely and maliciously; it is not a desire to pre-
actions from being brought in cases where they ought 
, be maintained, but the fear that if the rule were otherwise, 
. actions would be brought against persons who were 
l8(~tlJllg honestly in the discharge of a duty. It may be urged, 
that a false statement, known to be untrue, and 
ldictated by malice, should always be the subject of a civil 
But this bald me~hod of stating the question assumes 
the untruth and the malice. If by any process of demon-
free from the defects of human judgment, the un-
and malice could be set above and beyond all question 
there might be ground for contending that the law 
give damages to an injured person. But this is not 
state of things under which this question of law has to 
Whether statements were in fact untrue, 
whether they were dictated by malice, are, and always 
be, open questions, upon which opinions may differ, and 
can only be resolved by the exercise of human judgment. 
real question is whether it is proper on grounds of 
policy to remit such questions to the judgment of a 
The reasons against doing so are simple and obvious. 
. in judicial proceedings may be utterly free 
maliee, and yet in the eyes of a jury be open to that 
~utll1ti(l.n; or he may be cleared by the jury of the imputa-
) 
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tion, and may yet have to encounter the expense and distress 
of a harassing litigation. With such possibilities hanging 
over his head, he· cannot be expected to speak with that free 
and open mind which the adminiStration of justice demands." 
(Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Columb.L.Rev. 
463, 469-470.) 
[12] Oonversely,~ when the primary interest is regarded 
as being that of the plaintiff in his reputation, strict liability 
has been imposed. (See, Prosser, Torts, § 93, p. 816; and cases 
cit.ed.) This imposition of liability without fault, ·even in 
cases where actual damage appears doubtful (see, e. g., Hul-
tOti flOo. v. JOties [1909],2 K.B. 44, d'd [19101,A.O. 20), 
has been forcefully defended on the grounds that ., by at-
tempt by the law to distinguish between the motives of those 
who defame others would make the rules too intricate and 
provide too many possibilities of escape" (Paton, Reform and 
Ike Engluk Law of Defamation, 33 Ill.L.Rev. 669, 670), and 
that it is necessary to impose strict liability effectively to 
discourage negligent and intentional libels. (See, Morris, 
InadtJertent Newspaper liloel and Retraction, 32 Ill.L.Rev. 
36,45; cf., In re Marley. 29 Oa1.2d 525 [175 P.2d 832].) 
Thus in cases both of absolute privilege and strict liabil-
ity the importance of protectmg one interest or another 
has been considered suf6cient to justify the broadest immunity 
or liability to insure the desired immunity or liability. This 
court is not in a position to weigh the relative importance of 
the conflicting interests involved. and even if it were it should 
not attempt to do so. "Oourts can fu11ill their responsibility 
in a democratic society only to the extent that they succeed 
in shaping their judgments by ratioual standards, and ra-
tional standards are both impellonal and communicable.· Mat-. 
ters of policy, however. are by definition matters which demand 
the resolution of conflicts of value, and the elements of con-
flicting values are largely imponderable. Assessment of theil:"-
competing worth involves differences of feelings; it is also 
an exercise in prophecy. Obviously the proper forum for 
mediating a clash of feelings and rendering a prophetic judg-
ment is the body chosen for those purposes by the people. 
Its function can be assumed by this Oourt only in disregard-
of the historic limits of the Constitution." (Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, concurring in A.lI.L. v. American Sask ct D. Co., 
335 U.S. 538, 557 [69 S.Ot. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6 A.L.R.2d 
481).) 
We cannot S81' that in balancing the interests of defamed 
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plaintiffs against the interests of the public in the dissemina-
tion of news or the avoidance of the dangers of excessive gen-
eral damages, the Legislature reached an unconstitutional com-
promise in enacting section 48a. • 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., concurred. 
,< CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I From the writings of the world's wisest men we have the 
"assurance "that a good name is rather to be chosen than great 
riches, " Proverbs XXII :1 : and 
:f "Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls; 
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, notbiDg; 
i· 'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
t,t But he that filches from me my good name, 
t· Robs meo>f that which not enriches him, 
J' And makes me poor indeed." 
~ (Shakespeare. Othello, Act m, Se. 3) 
~ , But the thief can be' forced to return my purse and its 
~ntents, pay all expenses incurred by me in pursuit of it. 
and even though he apologizes profusely, he can be sent to 
prison for committing the theft. Whereas a newspaper or 
radio station may wilfUlly and maliciously defame my repu~ 
~~tion, hold me up to contempt, hatred, ridicule and obloquy, 
:ea.use me to be shunned and avoided, and then by a mere re-
o which may not be seen or heard of by more than one 
cent of those who read or heard of the defamation, escape 
the payment of such out-of-pocket loss as 1 may be able 
prove to the satisfaction of a jury, but all others guilty 
such defamation may be held liable for exemplary, as well 
IS"'A''''''''''' and special damages. This is the effect of the 
:.p'u~jOl'ity holding in this case. To say that I can not agree 
such sophistry is a gross understatement. I challenge its 
rt91llnclnelilS from the standpoint of both reason and authority. 
is no doubt in my mind but that the statute here 
ib'i'vnl'ITAIl (Civ. Code, § 48a) is unconstitutional in that it trs-
both the equal protection and due process clauses of 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
Criminals in California are treated with more uni-
lIO~ity and equality than an innocent plaintiff who has been 





138 WERNER tI. SoUTHERN CAL. ETC. NEWSPAPEBS [35 C.M 
defendant who has been gUilty of a crime committed through 
negligence and one who has been guilty of a crime committed 
with malice. Although the above-mentioned section draws 
a very definite distinction between members of the same class, 
and to my mind an unreasonable and arbitrary one, it does 
not draw any distinction between those guilty of uninten~ 
tional but negligent defamation and those guilty of wilful 
and malicio11l' defamation. 
Problems of classification under the California Constitution 
are similar to those presented by the federal equal protection 
of the law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under 
either proviSion, the mere production of inequality which 
necesSarily results to some degree in every selection of persons 
for regulation does not place the classification within the 
constitutional prohibition. The discrimination or inequality 
produced, in: order to conflict with the constitutional provi-
sions, must be "actually and palpabZy unreasonable and arbi-
trary." (People v. Western Fruit Grower., 22 Ca1.2d 494 
[140 P.2d 13].) I submit that the legislation in question 
makes an actual, palpable, Wholly unreasonable and arbitrary I 
classification. Newspapers and radio broadcasts are singled . 
out for the extension of a privilege which is not given to 
individUalS, magazine publishers, or other periodicals, sky-
writers, sound trucks, banner-bearing dirigibles, and bill-
boards, and probably television and motion picture producers. 
On the other side of the picture, plaintiffa maligned and de-
famed by those others are given rights and privileges not 
extended to plaintiffs who have suffered at the bands of news-
papers or the radio. 
The majority hold that there are two reasona why the classi-
fication made by tqe section is a reasonable one. The ft:rst of 
those reasons is that newspapers and radio stations must be 
protected against verdicts for excessive damages. Assuming 
there is any basis for the asserted danger of awards of exces-
sive damages, just why those two should be protected against 
excessive damages any more than magazines, the motion pi~ 
ture industry, or the others above mentioned, is far from 
clear. All are equally able to carry insurance designed to 
give such protection. 
Moreover, there is no factual or legal basis for the assump-
tion that excessive awards of damages will be made against 
newspapers or radio stations. in actions for defamation of 
character by individuals who claim to have been libeled or 
"andered b7 publications or 'broadcasts. T:be assertion in 
) 
) 
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tne majority opinion that juries are disposed to make excessive 
awards of damages against newspapers and radio stations in 
actions of this character is not only an unjust refiection upon 
our jury system, but is. factually and historically untrue. 
While the jury system still has its opponents, it cannot be 
denied that this system is so firmly embedded in our system . 
of jurisprudence that the latter could not survive without it. 
It is nevertheless true that ever since the promulgation of the 
Magna Charta in the year 1215 to the present time there have 
been those who would destroy the jury system. These re- '\ 
actionary minds decry what they are pleased to refer' to as the 
'evils of the system, and extol none of its virtues. Thus, the II ..
tendency of juries to award damages to those who have suf-
fered injury or wrong as the result of the wilful, malicious 
or negligent acts of others is condemned by these opponents 
of the jury system as an evil which should be abated. But 
... should this reactionary philosophy be injected into our system 
.. of jurisprudence by permitting its use as a basis for the classi-
. fication of tort feasors" The answer to this question should 
; be obvious to every unprejudiced mind. If the jury system is 
.to remain as it has stood for over seven centuries, then it 
'should be just as good for the newspaper or radio tort feasor 
~. any other, and its tendency to award damages, whether 
large or small, should not be made the basis of a classification 
:which confers special privileges upon certain tort feasors to 
detriment of those injured or defamed by them. History 
/JOl!lCluSl.veJ.y disproves the assertion in the majority opinion 
excessive awards of damages have been rendered against 
IiILew'BP~Lpe:rs and radio stations in libel and slander actions. 
,the 55 libelcases'a:ga:iIijCiiewspapers(there are none 
-=::co--- radio stations) which have come before this court and 
appellate courts of this state which I have been able to 
reported during the state's entire history, I find that 
,judgments for plaintiff were affirmed. These judgments 
follows: Wil8<m v. Fitch (1871), 41 Cal. 363, $7,500; 
_~aular(:ts v. San Jose Pro ~ Pub. Soc. (1893),99 Cal. 431 [34 
37 Am.St.Rep. 70], amount of damages not specified; 
v. McClatchy (1896), l11 Cal. 606 [44 P. 241], $500; 
v. Hearst (1897).118 Cal. 366 [50 P. 541], $500; Mizs 
·'.., ..... _d (1900), 130 Cal. 630 [63 P. 30], $6,250; Dunn v. 
(1903), 139 Cal. 239 [73 P. 138]. $500; Graybill v. 
(1903). 140 Cal. 323 [73 P. 1067). $1,000; Bohan 
Pub. Co. (1905),1 Cal.App. 429 [82 P. 634], $500; 
) 
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Tingley v. Times~Mirror 00. (1907), 151 Cal. 1 [89 P. 1097], 
$7,500; Ervin v. Record Pub: 00. (1908), 154 Cal. 79 [97 P. 
21, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 622], amount of damages not specified; 
Lewis v. Hayes (1918), 177 Cal. 587 [171 P. 293], $1,750; 
Waite v. San Fernando Pub. 00. (1918), 178 Cal. 303 (173 P. 
591], $3,000; Scott v. Times-Mirror 00., (1919), 181 Cal. 345 
[184 P. 672, 12 A.L.R. 1007], $37,500; Newby v. Times-Mirror 
00. (1920), 46 Cal. App. 110 [188 P. 1008], $7,500; Earl v. 
Times-Mirror 00. (1921), 185 Cal. 165 [196 P. 57], $25,000; 
Stevens v. Storke (1923), 191 Cal. 329 [216 P. 371], $1,000; 
Lyon v. Fairweather (1923), 63 Cal.App. 194 [218 P. 477], 
$750; Gloria v. A Oolonia Portuguesa (1933), 128 Cal.App. 
640 [18 P .2d 87], $21,000; Behrendt v . Times-Mirror 00. 
(1938),30 Cal.App.2d 77 [88 P.2d 949], $10,000. 
The foregoing record belies the assertion in the majority 
opinion that there is ·ccdanger of excessive recoveries of gen~ 
eral damages in libel actions" against newspapers. This 
record discloses that during the last hundred years only three 
judgments of over $20,000 were upheld by the appellate courts 
of this state, one for $10,000, and the remaining 15 for lesser 
amounts. True, there were other libel actions in which ver-
dicts were recovered against newspapers, but either new trials 
were granted or the jUdgments rendered on such verdicts 
were reversed on appeal in those cases. To rely upon such a 
record to justify a preferential classification of newspapers 
because of the •• danger of excessive recoveries of general 
damages in libel actions, H is like a drowning man grasping 
at a straw. The majority might, with equal logic hold that 
the Times-Mirror Company is entitled to a preferential classi-
fication because five of the above mentioned awards, and by far 
the largest, were against it. Furthermore, it might with equal 
justification be said that the Legislature could limit recovery 
to special damages in personal injury actions against rail~ 
roads and power companies because of the tendency of juries 
to make large awards of general damages in personal injury 
actions against those corporations because of their reputed 
vast wealth. While a majority of this court might be dis-
posed to uphold such a statute, I am disposed to believe that 
it would be stricken down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States as being in violation of the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. I submit that the argument advanced in the majority 
opinion in support of its preferential classification of new~ 
papers and radio stations on the above mentioned ground is 
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wholly unsound and utterly lacking in either factual or legal 
foundation. 
The second so-called reason given in the majority opinion 
to prove that this legislation is not a travesty on the equal 
protection clause, but is a reasonable classification, is that 
newspapers must be free to disseminate news. There is a re-
mote possibility that this reason might hold water if applied 
to inadvertent newspeper libel but it can hardly be called 
a good reason where the problem is one of malicious libel. In 
an article cited by the majority (Morris, Inadvertent News· 
paper libel and Retraction, 32 Ill.L.Rev. 36), it is pointed out 
that in at least 10 states (Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Massa· 
. ,chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
. ,Ohio, and Wisconsin), statutes purport to lessen the severity 
,'of the common law in cases in which inadvertent newspaper 
. libel is retracted. All of the statutes apply to libel published 
~'1n good faith," leaving the rigors of the common law intact 
for the malicious libeler. He points out that "The statutes 
can be classifted into two groups. In the Drst group the legis. 
latures provided that plaintiff shall recover only actual dam· 
'ages, but did not define' actual damages.' Courts have inter· 
these statutes to mean that non-punitive damages shall 
. recovered-with the result that the common law is not 
In the second group of statutes, the legislatures 
indicated that they intended to eliminate general dam· 
In these jurisdictions, either the statutes have been 
unconstitutional, or the scope of operation of the statute 
been so limited that only trifling, if any, change is effected. 
The signiftcance of the legislation is its aim, not its accom· 
. . . The statutes all suffer from a common defect. 
Bl<'_:lliegislature attempted to eliminate the recovery of general 
Why! I submit that the legislators.were impressed 
the exculpatory effect of retraction; they recognized 
'futility of attempting to vindicate the plaintiff by judg-
EJ~]lt after retraction, and the folly of taking money from 
to further that purpose. They then reasoned 
since general damages operate to exculpate the plaintiff 
_ ...... ".... the publisher has not retracted, and since the plaintiff 
no need of exculpation after retraction which can be 
by a money judgment, general damages should not 
when the publisher has retracted. The error in 
rea80ning Zies in the fact that general damages are needed 
, . other than exculpation. The assessmenf 01 gen-
aa1~aes solves an admonitory problem which does Mt 
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disappear with retractiQn. So the abolition of general dam-
ages is not justified on the ground that the exculpatorr func-
tion cannot be served by their retention." [Emphasis added.] 
The legislation here involved is certainly discriminatory 
in that it protects certain members of a class to the detriment 
of others. The requirement of proof of special damages means 
virtual abolition of legal responsibility for both inadvertent 
and malicious libel. It is a very rare situation where a plain-
tiff can trace and prove the special damage he has suffered 
from libelous matter printed in a newspaper or spoken over 
the radio about him. This does not mean that he may not have 
suffered sharply-but it does mean that he may never hear of 
business opportunities which would have been his had the 
"libelous stain" not appeared on his name plate. Those who 
read the libel may not read the retraction and if he loses 
business or professional opportunities which would otherwise 
have been his (although he does not know of them, or ClmD.ot 
prove his actual pecuniary loss as to them), he should be com-
pensated for the probable damage he has suffered and that 
which he will suffer in the future. Surely Mr. Morris is 
right when he says that •• The tendency toward flamboyance 
and haste in modern journalism should be checked rather than 
countenanced." The interest of the public in news cannot 
be said to outweigh the protection which every person is en-
titled to be given by the law to have his reputation remain 
unsmirched througb malice or negligence. Under the holding 
in this case, newspapers and radio may freely malign any 
person and be liable for only special damages if the plaintiff---. 
asks for and receives a'retraction, or if he does not ask for one. 
This will in effect allow these two favored means of publication 
to escape, in most instances, scot free, since the plaintiff will 
not be able to prove the exact special pecuniary loss he has 
suffered. 
In Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628 [47 S.E. 811, 66 L.RA. 
648], the same type of statute was held not to be unconstitu-
tional as a denial of due process of law since ., actual" damages 
were held to include aU save punitive damages. Mr. Justice 
Douglas, concurring, felt that the statute was unconstitutional 
as a denial of equal protection of the law. He said: " ... I 
feel constrained to say that, in my opinion, the so-called libel 
act is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it discriminates between 
the editor of a newspaper and the ordinary citizen. If I 
write a letter libeling an editor, that perhaps, at most, 10 
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against me that 10,000 people may see, I am subject to pains 
and penalties from which he'is exempted by operation of the 
statute. Whatever other merits the act may have, I do not 
think that such discrimination can be sustained under the 
explicit provision of our Constitution • • ." 
In Park v. Detroit Free PreS8 Oo~, 72 Mich. 560 [40 N.W. 
731, 1 L.R.A. 599], a statute such as ours was held unconsti-
tutional as a violation of due process of law, and the court 
said that a person's reputation was a species of property and 
that a retraction statute which left him with a remedy only' 
when he could prove special damages was leaving him with no 
effective remedy inasmuch as special damages were impossible 
, of proof in the majority of cases. The same result was reached 
, in Bafl.8tn& v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670 [75 P. 1041, 104 Am.St. 
Rep. 422, 64 L.R.A. 790]. In MeyerZ, v. Pitn&eer Pub. 00., 
45 'N.D. 568 [178 N.W. 792], the court held that the purpose 
,', of the statute was to give the publisher of a newspaper, "who 
through mistake or misapprehension in regard to the facts, 
in good faith publishes a libelous article, an opportunity to 
. retract and thereby, as far as possible, undo the wrong which 
he unintentionally did to the party libelled. " It' was held that 
the plaintiff, after retraction, could not recover exemplary 
, damages, but would be entitled to recover such genel'al or 
special damages as would compensate him for the injury 
• which remained unsatisfied after the publication of the retrac-
'tion. 
''- As an article in 23 So.Cal.L.Rev. 89 (1949) points out, 
J!.ID,g'W1ID and American COUl"ts, :ha:v~ JOJ:lg recognized the ,ad-. 
. 1,IU ....... .lUL • .., of retractionstU> mitigate damages in libel actions. 
statute that has attempted to benefit publishers by 
, a retraction for plaintUf's right to recover gen-
damages in libel actions against newspapers has been 
t:,~~-"",ue."'''' on constitutional grounds. Two were held un-
I~i)nsltitutilonlll as violative of due process and equal protection 
IH"a~IWO" v. Krehbiel, 8upra; Park v. Detroit Free Pre" 00., 
approved in McGee v. Baumgartner, 121 Mich. 287 
W. 21, 22]) ; two were judicially rewritten to include 
UI~~t:ral damages (Osborn v. Leach, 8upra; Meyerle v. Pione6f' 
00., supra), and tn&Zy one was allowed to emerge com-
unscathed." The one which emerged "completely 
I,Ql!lSCatliled" is the Minnesota statute involved in .AZlen v. 
5-rtlJ'fl.'!I!"_,,.,,.I!J!J! 00.,40 Minn. 117 [41 N.W. 936, 12 Am.St.Rep. 
L.R.A. 532}. cited in the majority opinion. It must 
that in the Allen case (decided by a divided toan. 
) 
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and sent back for a new trial), the statute involved provided 
that the plaintiff could still recover general damages,· even if 
Ihe retraction were published, unless the defendant could show 
ihat the Ubelous publication was made in good faith and under 
a mistake as to. the facts. This holding the majority opinion 
. does not mention. It; therefore, appears that the holding of 
the majority in this case is in conflict with every decided case 
involving a similar statute. 
Even if I assume that the majority is correct in stating 
that a cause of action for libel or slander was not frozen in 
our Constitution (" Every citizen may freely speak, write, 
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right; .•. " [Art. I, § 9]), I maintain 
that the person injured by such libel or slander has a cause of 
action guaranteed to him by the due process clause of both 
Constitutions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.) If 
the Legislature should abolish causes of action of replevin 
and conversion (trover) leaving me thus remediless for the 
loss of my car, I would consider that I was being deprived 
of my property without due process of law, and I consider 
the loss of reputation a valuable property right which can,. 
not be taken from an individual without giving him a fully 
adequate legal remedy so that he may be compensated, 89 far 
as possible, for the loss he has suffered and which he will 
suffer from the wrong done him. 
We may now assume that the Legislature (pushed by the 
powerful pressure_groups which play such a _shameful but 
important part in securing the adoption of special privilege 
legislation), having succeeded so well with its initial efforts 
(present statute held constitutional), may well decide next 
that all causes of action for libel and slander shall be abol,. 
ished. In this connection, let me point out that the "guest" 
statutes and causes of action for alienation of affections and 
breach of promise to marry, etc., are not good illustrations of 
the power of the Legislature to abolish a cause of action for 
an injury. The guest does not have to ride in a car as a 
guest, and affection is an iutangible attribute incapable of 
possession. From the beginning of time in this count.ry it 
has been understood that marriage is a "commodity" that 
cannot be forced on men and women. An entirely different 
factual situation is presented where an innocent person is 
defamed, either negligently or maliciously, and suffers irrep,. 
arable injury to his professional, occupatioDal· or busiDt'S8 
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reputation because of it. The least that can be done by the 
guilty one is to make such reparation in the form of money 
damages as will enable the maligned one to live until such 
time as he may again build up his reputation. 
This court held that a trade-mark and a trade-name are 
worthy of protection because through them the owner or 
possessor creates and preserves a "favorable reputation," to 
stimulate the sale of a product, and to distinguish it from 
similar competing products. (Sun-Maid Raisin Grower. t. 
Mosesian, 84 Cal.App. 485 [258 P. 630].) Injury to the 
standing and reputation of a business becomes an injury 
. to the good will of the business, and infringement upon a 
trade·mark which results in injury to the good will of the 
business may be enjoined. (Hall v. Holstrom, 106 Cal.App. 
563 [289 P. 668].) Words which are the subject of the good 
will and reputation of a business they designate, are entitled 
to the same protection as that afforded to one who has the 
prior right to a trade-mark, a symbol, character or words 
which have no common meaning and which are artificial. 
(Eastern Columbia, Inc. v. Waldman, 30 Cal.2d 268 [181 P.2d 
865] ; Barnes v. CahilZ, 56 Cal.App.2d 780 [133 P.2d 433j ; 
Hoyt Heater Co. v. Hoyt, 68 Cal.App.2d 523 [157 P.2d 657] ; 
Jackman v. Mau, 78 Cal.App.2d 234 [177 P.2d 599]; Weather-
ford v. Eytchison, 90 Cal.App.2d 379 [202 P.2d 1040].) And 
why are damages given in such cases T It is obvious that the 
reputation acquired by a business is in large measure respon-
sible for the profits it makes. Why is a tremendous sum spent 
every year in advertising the good reputation built up over 
the years in the manufacture of certain products' If this 
money is lost because busine$S is lost because of the libel or 
slander published by a newspaper or broadcast over the air, 
has the one so advertising lost nothing in the nature of prop-
,~, Any professional man's income or profit depends on 
JUs. reputation for honesty, integrity, fair dealing, ability and 
~~cal practices, and he will suffer in the same indefinite, but 
nevertheless very substantial, way by ita impairment or de-
privation. . 
rf:trThere is no room for holding, in a constitutional system, 
that private reputation is any more subject to be removed by 
t¢atute from full legal protection than life, liberty, or prop-
ifti. It is one of those rights necessary to human society 
that underlie the whole social scheme of civilization." (Park 
~',Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560 [40 N.W. 731,1 L.R.A. 
9].) These damages (to a person's reputation) are in the 
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nature of a property right j they have been said to constitute 
property. (See 17 C.J. 710, 829, 841. See Newell on I.ibel 
and Slander, p. 841 j Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 35 Minn. 251 
[28 N.W. 708] ; Cruikshank v. Bennett, 30 Mise. 232 [62 N.Y.S. 
118] ; Adams v. Scott, 33 S.D. 194 [145 N.W. 446] ; 17 R.C.L. 
430, 431; Osborn v. Leach, supra; MeyerZe v. Pioneer Pub. 
Co., supra.) 
When a cause of action arises it has a legal value as a 
chose in action-it i!; a species of property. Even where there 
is no legal measure of damages, as in case of slander or assault, 
the injured party has an indeterminate right to compensation 
the instant he receives the injury. The verdict of the jury 
and the judgment of the court thereon do not give, they only 
define, the right. Such right, when vested, is to the injured 
party, of the nature of property, and is protected, as property 
in tangible things, is protected. It cannot be annulled or 
changed by legislation, nor extinguished except by satisfac-
tion, release or the operation of statutes of limitation. 
(1 Sutherland on Damages, § 7, p. 26.) 
In holding a similar statute unconstitutional, as being in 
violation of the due process provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court 
of Kansas said: "From the writings of the world's wisest men 
we have the assurance 'that a good name is rather to be 
chosen that great riches.' Yet the possessor of this thing of 
greatest value, being despoiled of it, is left entirely without 
remedy for its loss by the statute in question, except in such 
rare cases as he shall be able to show some exact financial 
injury in the particulars named." (Hanson v. KrehbieZ, 68 
Kan. 670 [75 P. 1041, 1042, 104 Am.St.Rep. 422, 64 L.R.A. 
790] .) 
From the time of the Declaration of Independence the 
people of this country have declared that unalienable rights 
are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Both Con-
stitutions (California and United States) declare that no 
person shall be deprived of any of these rights without due 
process of law. In order to preserve life, in most instances, 
it is necessary for men to work that they may provide for 
themselves and their families. No member of this court can 
deny that a good reputation is something to be highly prized 
and cherished. No member of this court can deny that one's 
reputation has a great deal to do with the position one holds-
whether it be public office, a profession, a business, an occu-
pation, or the social position one holds in his community, his 
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consideration here evidently considers that a retraction pub-
lished is a fair comperisation for the inestimable, uncountable 
damage which newspapers and radio stations are capable of 
causing to an innocellt person. A school teacher labeled, 
either negligently or Jllaliciously, tLS a communist, may not 
lose her position, but she may lose an opportunity for advance-
ment of which she will tiot be aware. A doctor, dentist, attor-
ney, candidate for public office, an actor, actress. &inger, busi-
nessman or woman-all of these may lose opportunities, eli- . 
• ents, patients, positions, and business, because of the defama-
tion. These lost opportunities will not, in the general course 
of events, come to the attention of the loser. He has suffered 
a loss for which thedefflJller should pay. The injured person 
!,: is not compensated by a retraction which may not be re-ad or 
r heard by all who read or heard the defamatory words. We 
! have all heard the expression used among our contemporaries 
( that "where there is so much smoke there must be some fire." 
Since this expression has survived from the days of the Greek 
philosophers (Euphues and his Euphoebus. Arber's reprint, 
1579) until the present, it would seem a fair assumption that 
people will go right on saying and believing it. This court, 
in holding this statute eonstitutional, is depriving the injured 
person of a property right. As was said in the Hanson ease 
~. (supra): "It is suggested, however, that the retraction re-
i quired by the aet to be published is a fair compensation for 
t. the injury done, and a reinvestment of the libeled one with 
~ his good name. This being done, all has been accomplished that 
~would be by averdiet of a jury, and hence that the retraction 
t required by the legislative enactment is, if not 'due course 
~of law,' an ample substitute for it. It is not an easy task to 
t, deduce either from reason or the authorities a satisfaetory de:6nition of 'law of the land' or 'due course of law.' We feel 
. safe, however, from either standpoint, in saying these terms 
~do not mean any act that the Legislature may have passed 
~U such aet does not give to one opportunity to be heard before r being deprived of property, liberty, or reputation, or having 
tbeen deprived of either does not dord a like opportunity of 
a,showing the extent of his injury, and give an adequate rem-
~.~ to reeover therefor. Whatever these terms may mean 
. ore than this, they do mean due and orderly procedure of 
~urts in the aseertainment of damages for injury, to the end 
. t the injured one 'shall have remedy'-that is, proper 
.d adequate remedy-thus to be aseertained. To refuse 
) 
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hearing and remedy for injury after its infliction is small 
remove from infliction of penalty before and without hearing." 
The following statement in the majority opinion deserves 
some comment: "Moreover, in balancing the danger of recov-
eries of excessive general damages against leaving plaintiffs 
with no effective remedy for injury to their reputations. the 
Legislature could properly take into consideration the fact 
that a retraction widely circulated by a newspaper or radio 
station would have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an 
individual and could thus class newspapers and radio stations 
apart. " This argument is clearly and concisely answered 
by Professor G. W. Paton (University of Melbourne, Austra-
lia) in his article It Reform and the English Law of Defama-
tion," (33 Ill.L.Rev. 669). Professor Paton states that the 
law of torts exists to grant a certain security to a person '8 
reputation, physical integrity and good, and, if that secnrity 
be invaded, to award damages. The power of the press to 
destroy the reputation of an individual is so great that strict 
rules are nel!essary to secure a balance. He says that "It is 
true that there are speculative litigants whose one desire is to 
reap a golden recompense for some fancied slight: that some-
times a person, with no real reputation to lose, recovers dam-
ages based on the view that he had a reputation: very occasion-
ally a newspaper has suffered because a fictitious name it has 
chosen fits someone in real life. All this is admitted, but the 
corollary of the great power of the modern press i.~ a strict 
sense of responsibility for the rep1dation of those who lie at 
their mercy and, as if is Utopian to consider that such an 
attitude of mind can be ind1tced save by the severest sanctions 
of the law, strict liaMlity is justifiable by its effect. It must 
be remembered that a newspap~r has no professional privilege 
to traffic in the reputation of others." [Emphasis added.1 
The last statement in the just quoted article is to be found 
in libel cases against newspapers decided in this state prior 
to the enactment of the legislation here considered. It should 
be noted that rather than imposing stricter liability upon 
newspapers and radio stations because of the great power they 
possess to ruin the reputation of otherI'!. either carelessly or 
maliciously, the section provides for a if'sser liability! To illus-
trate the utter futility of a newspaper or radio retraction, 
eonsider the case of a candidate for public office who hu.s been 
publicly and falsely accused a few days before election of 
having committed several crimes, of being a p<'rson of low 
ebaracter and of dishonest nature. He requests a retraction 
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which, if time permits, may be given before the election, or 
if time does not permit, after the election. He is not elected. 
He cannot prove that the libel caused him to lose the election 
although he and his advisors are certain it was the cause. 
Consider, too, that he has lost the election becau:;e untrue 
defamatory matter was widely published about him and that 
this may have been done maliciously for that very purpose. 
Consider, too, that because of it, the possibility of a favorable 
outcome of any future election is very remote. Is this candi-
date for public office to have no restitution from the one 
guilty of the wrong f The majority opinion say~ .. No. .. I do 
. not agree. 
The majority state that "This court is not in a position to 
weigh the relative importance of the conflicting interests in-
vol ved, and even if it were it should not attempt to do so." 
It most assuredly is the duty of this court to scrutinize care-
fully any legislation in order to determine whether it is un-
. reasonable or discriminatory. The people have the right to 
expect that the members of this court will possess the courage 
and integrity necessary to declare unconstitutional any legis-
lation which contravenes the rights of the people as set forth 
in the due process and equal protection clauses of both Con-
stitutions. This court should invoke these constitutional guar-
antees to protect the rights of those who are wronged by 
.such legislation and should not be servile to any interest or 
.influence regardless of the power it wields. 
~' ... ' The majority opinion quotes from a dissenting opinion writ-
ten by the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the case of 
, . v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 [50 8.0t. 436, 74 L.Ed. 
, in which he speaks .of the tendency of the court to give 
emphasis to the due process· provision of the Fourteenth 
~U':J.1U1JI1t:L1L in striking down legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes 
not there concerned with a statute conferring a special 
,1D'ivile~'p upon a particular group such as we have here, but 
. concerned with a taxation matter. I have no doubt that 
great liberal minded Mr. Justice Holmes, with his courage, 
_,',,,.1,,.. ..... and foresight, would be the first to speak out against 
~eciiBI privilege legislation of this character in order that it 
be struck down as violathre of both the due process and 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
lilCl'llS1tltlltI<>n of the United' States. 
have hereinbpfore referred to pressure groups and their 
effect UpOll legislation in this state. By this reference 
) 
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I do not mean to cast the slightest reflection upon the members 
of the California Legislature, past or present. Both my son 
and I have served as members of this body, and I am in a 
position to know that. considering the great variety and the 
tremendous importance of the problems presented, the time 
available for their consideration and solution, and the pressure 
exerted by different groups seeking special privilege legisla. 
tion. the members of the Legislature render a commendable 
public service and are entitled to the confidence, respect and 
commendation of the people of this state. But I am not so 
naive that 1 do not realize that they may yield to some of the 
pressure exerted, and with reference to the particular lcgis. 
lation here onder consideration, that that pressure may have 
been of a most powerful nature. It is not unlikely that the 
constitutional prohibition against this legislation was con· 
sidered by the Legislature and that that body concluded that 
this was a matter for the courts to determine. It is just as 
probable that the Legislature was not favored with the argu. 
ments here advanced against thi!: legislation on constitutional 
~rollnds before adopting it. Since T feel so strongly that this 
statute violates the due process of law and equal protection 
provisions of both our state and federal Constitutions, I would· 
be violating my solemn oath to support both of these Constitu· 
tions if I did not cast my vote as a member of this court to 
strike it down-and this I have done. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is only in respect to privi. 
lege as to deliberately false and malicious publications by news-
papers that this dissent is ,:lirected. 
I think that there is a substantial difference between, on the 
one hand, an inadvertently false defamation and, on the other 
band, a ~efamation which is known to be false and which is 
wilfully and maliciously published. That difference, it seems 
to me, assumes legally significant importance when we examine 
the constitutional questions which are raised by the subject 
legislation. I agree in large measure with Justice Traynor's 
discussion of the constitutional principles involved but I do 
not agree that those principles extend to the protection of 
the publication of defamatory matter which is known to be 
false and which is delibcrately and maliciously uttered. 
Justice Traynor says, "There are at least two bases on 
which the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the 
retraction provisions of section 48a provide a reasonable sub-
) 
) 
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stitute for general damages in actions for defamation against 
newspapers and radio stations. namely. the danger of excessive 
recoveries of general damages in libel actions and the public 
interest in the free dissemination of news." 
Considering the above stated two bases in relation to mali-
ciously and deliberately uttered known-to-be-false defama-
tions, I think that their substance completely vanishes. The 
first asserted base is "the danger of exce~ive recoveries of 
general damages in libel actions." But does the policy of 
the state consider, or permit this court to bt'lieve, that there 
is any danger of "excessive recoveries of general damages" in 
libel actions which are based on knowingly false, deliberate 
and malicious publications' Why does the law provide for 
punitive damages, as agaif'!'It other defamers, where the mat-
ter is known to be false and is deliberately, wilfully and mali-
ciously published' If the state has any such policy as is 
suggested for base No.1, why does it provide that in all libel 
cases other than against a newspaper or radio broadcasting 
company (nnder the conditions specified in Civ. Code, § 48a), 
where the conditions of malice, knowledge and wilfulness ob-
tain. that pnnitive damages may be assessed' 
Base No. 2 is stated in the majority opinion to be ,. the 
public interest in the free dissemination of news. " But surely 
the license, whether limited or nnlimited, to wilfully. know-
ingly and maliciously utter false and defamatory matter docs 
not serve "the public interest in the free dissemination of 
news"; rather does it tend to defeat that interest by en-
couraging the malicious dissemination of matter known to be 
false. 
It is contended, in defenSe of the majority position, that 
the legislation can be sustained "not because the malicious 
conduct of such persons ought not to be actionable, but because, 
if their conduct were actionable, actions would be brought 
against them in cases in which they had not spoken falsely 
and maliciously ... And the real question is whether it is 
proper on gronnds of public policy to remit such questions to 
the judgment of a jury." The example cited in the text as 
quoted by the majority opinion is the immunity given partici-
pants in a judicial proceeding. The argument is not persua-
sive to me. The most regular participants in judicial proceed-
ings are judges. Judges of courts are public officers, respon-
sible to the people; while they may not be sued for libel or 
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selected or self-constituted, and they are subject to election 
and recall. The people have no such power over newspaper 
publishers who, conceivably, can be completely irresponsible. 
Likewise, as to other participants (than judges) in judicial 
proceedings, there is a fundamental difference between their 
relationship to such a public governmental proceeding and the 
relationship of a publisher to his private enterprise; so too, 
is there a very basic difference between a court, which is an 
institution of government, and a newspaper, which is a pri-
vate enterpriSe. (And it is to be d~voutlyhoped that the 
difference shall never be destroyed.) 
Furthermore, I think that section 9, article I, of our Cali-
fornia Constitution is entitled to more significance in its 
application here than is accorded it by the majority. It 
provides that .. Every citizen may freely speak, write, and 
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain 
or abridge the liberty of speech or'of the press!' I think that 
the clause "being responsible for the abuse of that right" 
has aftirmative rather than mere negative significance. I 
think that responsibility for abuse of the right is a funda-
mental part of our concept of freedom of speech and press. 
It forms a part of the definition of the very liberty which is 
guaranteed. Unless there is responsiblity for abuse of the 
right then such right becomes more than a "liberty"; it 
becomes a license. The malicious and deliberate publication of 
that which is known to be false, uttered for the sole purpose 
of injuring the subject, is not, in my estimation, within the 
freedom guaranteed' by the Constitution. Rather is such a 
. pUblication an "abuse of that right" to which the liberty 
does not extend. I 
The courts have been most zealous to protect freedom 
of speech and press against prior restraint. There is no ac-
cepted principle of constitutional law which suggests that 
they should be so zealous to absolve from subsequent respon-
Jlibility for a clear abuse of the liberty. Indeed, the very 
IJtrictness of the rule against prior restraints bespeaks need of 
wbsequent responsibility for abuses. 
Even if we assume, notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tion 9, article I, relative to responsibility for abuse of the 
right, that the Legislature could completely abolish the cause 
of action for libel, such assumption does not save the statute 
here. The Legislature has not abolished a cause of action; 
neither has it undertaken to define an "abuse of that right'" 
\ 
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for which the publisher may be responsible. If the suojcct 
statute had extended the exemption to general damages only 
it would be far easier to defend. But by framing the statute 
to exempt both general and punitive liability for the most 
pernicious abuse to which a newspaper may be put, it seems 
that what the Legislature has really done is to create a special 
privilege for an arbitrarily selected class. The special privi-
lege is exemption from liability for general and punitive 
damages for libel, whether deliberate and malicious or merely 
inadvertent, unless a retraction is requested and refused. 
The retraction, if demanded and published, may be followed 
immediately by a new defamation. By the express terms of 
the statute it extends the exemption to include the deliberate 
and malicious publication of known falsehoods. Since the 
privilege is extended to deliberately false and malicious pub-
lications it is, in effect, a license to defame. Such privilege 
or license is extended to, and only to, newspapers and radio 
broadcasting companies. The metropolitan daily and the 
rural weekly have the privilege; United States News and 
W orId Report, Time Magazine, Esquire, Fortune, etc., do not. 
What reasonable basis is there for giving the "newspaper," 
whether daily or weekly, such license to deliberately and mali-
ciously defame while withholding that license from magazines 
of every type' Why should magazines and pUblications gen-
erally, other than newspapers and radio broadcasting com-
panies, be subject to punitive as well as general damages for 
malicious publications while the special class is exempt' 
Assuming that there is a reasonable basis for the c1assmcation 
insofar as inadvertent libel is concerned, I find none for such 
classification in relation to the special privilege to deliberately 
defame. \ 
At the beginning of this discussion I pointed out that the 
majority opinion declares the proposition that "There are at 
least two bases on which the Legislature could reasonably 
conclude that the retraction provisions of section 48a provide 
a reasonable substitute for general damages in actions for 
defamation against newspapers and radio stations, namely, 
the danger of excessive recoveries of general damages in libel 
actions and the public interest in the free dissemination of 
news." It has been shown that both of those bases disappear 
when applied to deliberately false and malicious publications. 
And there is a still more fatal inadequacy in the majority 
position. 
The fundamental part of their proposition is that the 
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"Legislature could reasonably conclude that the retraction 
provisions . .•. provide a reasonable substitute for general 
damages in actions for defamation against newspapers and 
radio stations. '.' That proposition completely ignores the 
element of punitive damages. The statute relieves its benefi-
ciaries from liability for punitive as well as general damages. 
What reasonable substitute is provided for punitive damages' 
Certainly not the retraction provision. In full compliance 
with the law and shielded by it, the publisher could follow 
every retraction with a reiteration of the same or a still more 
calumnious defamation. There is sound policy behind the law 
which provides for exemplary damages in certain cases. 
(" [W]here the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud 
or malice ... the plaintiff,in addition to the actual dam-
ages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way 
of punishing the defendant." (Civ. Code, § 3294.) If this law 
is good generally what reasonable basis is there for exempt-
ing "newspapers and radio stations" in relation to their 
deliberately false and malicious publications' 
I reiterate that it is only in respect to the licensing, in effect, 
of deliberately false and malicious publications that this dis-
sent is directed. I cannot think that the great body of repu-
table newspapers and radio broadcasting companies which 
serve our country and our people so well would ever stoop to 
the vicious practices which the statute would permit. But 
there is nothing to prevent vicious persons from entering the 
publishing business and from taking full advantage of the· 
law as it is upheld. The reputable publishers themselves may 
in the long run suffer more from the nefarious practices of 
which the law permits and which it encourages than they 
would from defending a few libel actions against the unfounded 
---charge of falsity and malice. 
Since the majority opinion affirms the judgment on the 
theory that section 48a is valid in its every element and appli-
cation I do not discuss whether what I believe to be the in-
valid portions or applications of the statute could be deleted 
and the remainder upheld. Likewise, for the purposes of this 
dissent, I accept the implications of the majority that affirm-
ance of the judgment depends on sustaining the statute in its 
entirety. 
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 11, 
1950. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
